Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels?. Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C., & Panangaden, P. Proc. 2nd Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing, LNCS. Springer, 4661/2007:281-300, 2006. Paper doi abstract bibtex We propose a framework in which anonymity protocols are interpreted as particular kinds of channels, and the degree of anonymity provided by the protocol as the converse of the channel\textquoterights capacity. We also investigate how the adversary can test the system to try to infer the user\textquoterights identity, and we study how his probability of success depends on the characteristics of the channel. We then illustrate how various notions of anonymity can be expressed in this framework, and show the relation with some definitions of probabilistic anonymity in literature. This work has been partially supported by the INRIA DREI Équipe Associée PRINTEMPS. The work of Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis and Catuscia Palamidessi has been also supported by the INRIA ARC project ProNoBiS.
@article {chatzikokolakis2006apn,
title = {Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels?},
journal = {Proc. 2nd Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing, LNCS. Springer},
volume = {4661/2007},
year = {2006},
pages = {281-300},
abstract = {We propose a framework in which anonymity protocols are interpreted as particular kinds of channels, and the degree of anonymity provided by the protocol as the converse of the channel{\textquoteright}s capacity. We also investigate how the adversary can test the system to try to infer the user{\textquoteright}s identity, and we study how his probability of success depends on the characteristics of the channel. We then illustrate how various notions of anonymity can be expressed in this framework, and show the relation with some definitions of probabilistic anonymity in literature.
This work has been partially supported by the INRIA DREI {\'E}quipe Associ{\'e}e PRINTEMPS. The work of Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis and Catuscia Palamidessi has been also supported by the INRIA ARC project ProNoBiS.},
keywords = {anonymity},
isbn = {978-3-540-75333-9},
issn = {0302-9743},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-75336-0},
url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/04247873k1719274/},
author = {Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis and Catuscia Palamidessi and Prakash Panangaden}
}
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