Firm risk and proxy fights: Evidence from SOX. Chen, F., Huang, J., & Yu, H. Accounting and Finance Research, 7(2):96, February, 2018. Paper doi abstract bibtex The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is documented to curb executive risk-taking and firm risk. Utilizing SOX as an exogenous shock on firm risk, we find that proxy fight threats are positively related to a firm’s total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, although firm risk generally decreases post-SOX, high proxy fight threats mitigate this change in firm risk. We also find that although firms adopt more conservative policies such as decreasing their leverage and payout post-SOX, these changes are mitigated by proxy fight threats. In sum, our findings indicate that proxy fights act as an external disciplinary mechanism, encourage executive risk-taking, and increase firm risk.
@article{chen_firm_2018,
title = {Firm risk and proxy fights: {Evidence} from {SOX}},
volume = {7},
issn = {1927-5994, 1927-5986},
shorttitle = {Firm risk and proxy fights},
url = {http://www.sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/afr/article/view/13049},
doi = {10.5430/afr.v7n2p96},
abstract = {The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is documented to curb executive risk-taking and firm risk. Utilizing SOX as an exogenous shock on firm risk, we find that proxy fight threats are positively related to a firm’s total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, although firm risk generally decreases post-SOX, high proxy fight threats mitigate this change in firm risk. We also find that although firms adopt more conservative policies such as decreasing their leverage and payout post-SOX, these changes are mitigated by proxy fight threats. In sum, our findings indicate that proxy fights act as an external disciplinary mechanism, encourage executive risk-taking, and increase firm risk.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2019-10-08},
journal = {Accounting and Finance Research},
author = {Chen, Fang and Huang, Jian and Yu, Han},
month = feb,
year = {2018},
keywords = {dept.fin},
pages = {96},
}
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