Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs?

Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs?. Chu, Z., Pinceti, A., Biswas, R. S., Kosut, O., Pal, A., & Sankar, L. In IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm), pages 1–6, Beijing, China, October, 2019.

Paper abstract bibtex

Intelligently designed false data injection (FDI) attacks have been shown to be able to bypass the Ï‡2-test based bad data detector (BDD), resulting in physical consequences (such as line overloads) in the power system. In this paper, using synthetic PMU measurements and intelligently designed FDI attacks, it is shown that if an attack is suddenly injected into the system, a predictive filter with sufficient accuracy is able to detect it. However, an attacker can gradually increase the magnitude of the attack to avoid detection, and still cause damage to the system.

@inproceedings{chu_can_2019,
	address = {Beijing, China},
	title = {Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs?},
	url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8909739},
	abstract = {Intelligently designed false data injection (FDI) attacks have been shown to be able to bypass the Ï‡2-test based bad data detector (BDD), resulting in physical consequences (such as line overloads) in the power system. In this paper, using synthetic PMU measurements and intelligently designed FDI attacks, it is shown that if an attack is suddenly injected into the system, a predictive filter with sufficient accuracy is able to detect it. However, an attacker can gradually increase the magnitude of the attack to avoid detection, and still cause damage to the system.},
	booktitle = {IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)},
	author = {Chu, Zhigang and Pinceti, Andrea and Biswas, Reetam Sen and Kosut, Oliver and Pal, Anamitra and Sankar, Lalitha},
	month = oct,
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Current measurement, Phasor measurement units, Smart grids, Time measurement, Transmission line measurements, Voltage measurement},
	pages = {1--6},
}

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