When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position. Chung, H. Economics and Philosophy, 39(2):308 – 333, 2023. Publisher: Cambridge University Press Type: Article![When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic consequences and social outcomes generated either by utilitarianism or Rawls's two principles of justice. It will be shown that when the differences in people's productive abilities are sufficiently great, utilitarianism dominates Rawls's two principles of justice by providing a higher level of overall well-being to every member of society. Whenever this is the case, the parties can rely on the Principle of Dominance (which is a direct implication of instrumental rationality) to choose utilitarianism over Rawls's two principles of justice. Furthermore, when this is so, utilitarianism is free from one of its most fundamental criticisms that it 'does not take seriously the distinction between persons' (Rawls 1971 [1999]: 24). © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.
@article{chung_when_2023,
title = {When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position},
volume = {39},
issn = {02662671},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85172662348&doi=10.1017%2fS0266267122000098&partnerID=40&md5=3af1cfd659e60699a79f267c56d3465a},
doi = {10.1017/S0266267122000098},
abstract = {The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic consequences and social outcomes generated either by utilitarianism or Rawls's two principles of justice. It will be shown that when the differences in people's productive abilities are sufficiently great, utilitarianism dominates Rawls's two principles of justice by providing a higher level of overall well-being to every member of society. Whenever this is the case, the parties can rely on the Principle of Dominance (which is a direct implication of instrumental rationality) to choose utilitarianism over Rawls's two principles of justice. Furthermore, when this is so, utilitarianism is free from one of its most fundamental criticisms that it 'does not take seriously the distinction between persons' (Rawls 1971 [1999]: 24). © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.},
language = {English},
number = {2},
journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
author = {Chung, Hun},
year = {2023},
note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Type: Article},
pages = {308 -- 333},
}
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