Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals. Ciardelli, I., Zhang, L., & Champollion, L. Linguistics and Philosophy, 41(6):577-621, 2018. Paper doi abstract bibtex Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.
@article{Ciardelli:18counterfactuals,
abstract = {Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.},
author = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Zhang, Linmin and Champollion, Lucas},
date-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},
date-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},
doi = {10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},
issn = {1573-0549},
journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
keywords = {conditionals},
number = {6},
pages = {577-621},
title = {Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},
volume = {41},
year = {2018},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},
Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4}}
Downloads: 0
{"_id":"uPbYp3NGRbAwhrsxe","bibbaseid":"ciardelli-zhang-champollion-twoswitchesinthetheoryofcounterfactuals-2018","author_short":["Ciardelli, I.","Zhang, L.","Champollion, L."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","abstract":"Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Ciardelli"],"firstnames":["Ivano"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Zhang"],"firstnames":["Linmin"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Champollion"],"firstnames":["Lucas"],"suffixes":[]}],"date-added":"2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000","date-modified":"2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000","doi":"10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4","issn":"1573-0549","journal":"Linguistics and Philosophy","keywords":"conditionals","number":"6","pages":"577-621","title":"Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals","url":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4","volume":"41","year":"2018","bdsk-url-1":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4","bdsk-url-2":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4","bibtex":"@article{Ciardelli:18counterfactuals,\n\tabstract = {Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.},\n\tauthor = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Zhang, Linmin and Champollion, Lucas},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},\n\tissn = {1573-0549},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},\n\tkeywords = {conditionals},\n\tnumber = {6},\n\tpages = {577-621},\n\ttitle = {Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals},\n\turl = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},\n\tvolume = {41},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},\n\tBdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4}}\n\n","author_short":["Ciardelli, I.","Zhang, L.","Champollion, L."],"key":"Ciardelli:18counterfactuals","id":"Ciardelli:18counterfactuals","bibbaseid":"ciardelli-zhang-champollion-twoswitchesinthetheoryofcounterfactuals-2018","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4"},"keyword":["conditionals"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}}},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"https://projects.illc.uva.nl/inquisitivesemantics/assets/files/papers.bib","dataSources":["x2Aox4ZP7RsyuDjWX","LaLDs2mrYhQpgH6Lk"],"keywords":["conditionals"],"search_terms":["two","switches","theory","counterfactuals","ciardelli","zhang","champollion"],"title":"Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals","year":2018}