Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals. Ciardelli, I., Zhang, L., & Champollion, L. Linguistics and Philosophy, 41(6):577-621, 2018.
Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.
@article{Ciardelli:18counterfactuals,
	abstract = {Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.},
	author = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Zhang, Linmin and Champollion, Lucas},
	date-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},
	date-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},
	doi = {10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},
	issn = {1573-0549},
	journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
	keywords = {conditionals},
	number = {6},
	pages = {577-621},
	title = {Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},
	volume = {41},
	year = {2018},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4}}

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