The problem of the past. Cockburn, D. The Philosophical Quarterly, 37(146):54, 1987. ![The problem of the past [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex [first paragraph] There is a certain frame of mind in which we can be puzzle question: How can what is going to happen be anything to me now more readily accessible, however, is the frame of mind in wh puzzled by the question: How can what has happened be anyth now? How can the past make any demands on my present a feelings? What happened in the past may have effects in the pres given, we might say, that the past event no longer exists, is over with for good, how can it provide me with any reason for present feeling? Such questions find their clearest expression within phil the interest in moral outlooks, such as utilitarianism, which hold has happened can never, in itself, provide us with a reason to anything. They are, however, also connected with detailed disc particular ways in which what has happened can provide us with do or feel certain things now; the way, for example, in whi somebody has done can be a reason for praising or blaming him.
@article{Cockburn1987,
abstract = {[first paragraph] There is a certain frame of mind in which we can be puzzle question: How can what is going to happen be anything to me now more readily accessible, however, is the frame of mind in wh puzzled by the question: How can what has happened be anyth now? How can the past make any demands on my present a feelings? What happened in the past may have effects in the pres given, we might say, that the past event no longer exists, is over with for good, how can it provide me with any reason for present feeling? Such questions find their clearest expression within phil the interest in moral outlooks, such as utilitarianism, which hold has happened can never, in itself, provide us with a reason to anything. They are, however, also connected with detailed disc particular ways in which what has happened can provide us with do or feel certain things now; the way, for example, in whi somebody has done can be a reason for praising or blaming him.},
author = {Cockburn, David},
doi = {10.2307/2220061},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Cockburn - 1987 - The problem of the past.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00318094},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
number = {146},
pages = {54},
title = {{The problem of the past}},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-lookup/doi/10.2307/2220061},
volume = {37},
year = {1987}
}
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