@article{cohen_independent_????,
	title = {Independent {Judicial} {Review}: {A} {Blessing} in {Disguise}},
	issn = {0144-8188},
	shorttitle = {Independent {Judicial} {Review}},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818813000793},
	doi = {10.1016/j.irle.2013.10.006},
	abstract = {Abstract
Traditional political-economy wisdom implies that independent judicial review is a commitment device, used by politicians to credibly validate policies they sell to special-interest groups. This study suggests a somewhat opposite thesis, whereby independent judicial review allows politicians to credibly commit to destabilizing the validity of such policies. Due to the probable judicial intervention—as a result of the independent judicial review process—the expected policy in force will align more closely with general-interests, insofar as constitutional standards are so oriented. Thus social welfare increases and the politician gains electoral benefits which are otherwise unattainable in equilibrium.},
	urldate = {2013-11-18},
	journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
	author = {Cohen, Alon},
	keywords = {Constitution, Contributions, Judicial Independence, Judicial Review, lobbying},
	file = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:files/47714/Cohen - Independent Judicial Review A Blessing in Disguis.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:files/47715/S0144818813000793.html:text/html}
}

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