Rip it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon. Colaço, D. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. doi abstract bibtex In this paper, I investigate the nature of empirical findings that provide evidence for the characterization of a scientific phenomenon, and the defeasible nature of this evidence. To do so, I explore an exemplary instance of the rejection of a characterization of a scientific phenomenon: memory transfer. I examine the reason why the characterization of memory transfer was rejected, and analyze how this rejection tied to researchers' failures to resolve experimental issues relating to replication and confounds. I criticize the presentation of the case by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who claim that no sufficient reason was provided to abandon research on memory transfer. I argue that skeptics about memory transfer adopted what I call a defeater strategy, in which researchers exploit the defeasibility of the evidence for a characterization of a phenomenon.
@article{Colaco,
abstract = {In this paper, I investigate the nature of empirical findings that provide evidence for the characterization of a scientific phenomenon, and the defeasible nature of this evidence. To do so, I explore an exemplary instance of the rejection of a characterization of a scientific phenomenon: memory transfer. I examine the reason why the characterization of memory transfer was rejected, and analyze how this rejection tied to researchers' failures to resolve experimental issues relating to replication and confounds. I criticize the presentation of the case by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who claim that no sufficient reason was provided to abandon research on memory transfer. I argue that skeptics about memory transfer adopted what I call a defeater strategy, in which researchers exploit the defeasibility of the evidence for a characterization of a phenomenon.},
author = {Cola{\c{c}}o, David},
doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.04.003},
file = {:Users/khm/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Cola{\c{c}}o - 2018 - Rip it up and start again The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon(2).pdf:pdf},
issn = {00393681},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
title = {{Rip it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon}}
}
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