Consent without memory. Craver, C. F. & Rosenbaum, R. S. In Michaelian, K., Debus, D., & Perrin, D., editors, New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, pages 259–275. Routledge, New York, 2018.
abstract   bibtex   
[first paragraph] Can someone with episodic amnesia consent to participate in a scientific experiment? Episodic memory is widely regarded as the capacity to remem- ber knowingly experiences of specific events from one's personal past (Tul- ving, 1985). Individuals with severe episodic amnesia sometimes cannot episodically remember even a single such event and fail to lay down new episodic memories going forward. In some special cases, such individuals have maximally severe deficits in episodic memory while their intellectual ability and other cognitive functions (e.g., semantic recall, procedural learn- ing, working memory) remain in control range (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Such individuals afford the unique opportunity to investigate how episodic memory specifically contributes to other cognitive capacities and more gen- erally, to the distinctive lives of persons. We can thus invert the opening question: What, if anything, does episodic memory contribute to the fact that persons can, and so deserve the right to, consent?
@incollection{Craver2018,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Can someone with episodic amnesia consent to participate in a scientific experiment? Episodic memory is widely regarded as the capacity to remem- ber knowingly experiences of specific events from one's personal past (Tul- ving, 1985). Individuals with severe episodic amnesia sometimes cannot episodically remember even a single such event and fail to lay down new episodic memories going forward. In some special cases, such individuals have maximally severe deficits in episodic memory while their intellectual ability and other cognitive functions (e.g., semantic recall, procedural learn- ing, working memory) remain in control range (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Such individuals afford the unique opportunity to investigate how episodic memory specifically contributes to other cognitive capacities and more gen- erally, to the distinctive lives of persons. We can thus invert the opening question: What, if anything, does episodic memory contribute to the fact that persons can, and so deserve the right to, consent?},
address = {New York},
author = {Craver, Carl F. and Rosenbaum, R. Shayna},
booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Craver, Rosenbaum - 2018 - Consent without memory.pdf:pdf},
pages = {259--275},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{Consent without memory}},
year = {2018}
}

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