@article{Curry2018,
abstract = {Descartes held the following view of declarative memory: to remember is to reconstruct an idea that you intellectually recognize as a reconstruction. Descartes countenanced two overarching varieties of declarative memory. To have an intellectual memory is to intellectually reconstruct a universal idea that you recognize as a reconstruction, and to have a sensory memory is to neurophysiologically reconstruct a particular idea that you recognize as a reconstruction. Sensory remembering is thus a capacity of neither ghosts nor machines, but only of human beings qua mind-body unions. This interpretation unifies Descartes's various remarks (and conspicuous silences) about remembering, from the 1628 Rules for the Direction of the Mind through the suppressed-in-1633 Treatise of Man to the 1649 Passions of the Soul. It also rebuts a prevailing thesis in the current secondary literature—that Cartesian critters can remember—while incorporating the textual evidence for that thesis—Descartes's detailed descriptions of the corporeal mechanisms that construct sensory memories.},
author = {Curry, Devin Sanchez},
doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.03.001},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Curry - 2018 - Cartesian critters can't remember.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00393681},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
pages = {72--85},
title = {{Cartesian critters can't remember}},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0039368117302376},
volume = {69},
year = {2018}
}

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