Corruption, Bureaucratic Failure and Social Policy Priorities. Dahlström, C., Lindvall, J., & Rothstein, B. Political Studies, 2012.
Corruption, Bureaucratic Failure and Social Policy Priorities [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
This article argues that bureaucratic capacity – the competence and reliability of the national bureaucracy – matters to the allocation of public spending among welfare state programmes since it is difficult for governments to justify high levels of spending on programmes that require bureaucrats to make case-by-case decisions, on a discretionary basis, if the bureaucracy is incompetent, corrupt or both. We expect bureaucratic capacity to have a positive effect on programmes that involve bureaucratic discretion, but weak or no effects on programmes that are more straightforward to implement. In order to test these hypotheses, we analyse public spending on active labour market programmes (which involve a lot of discretion) and parental leave benefits (which involve less discretion). Relying on data for twenty advanced democracies from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, we find that high bureaucratic capacity does have a positive effect on active labour market policy spending, but not on parental leave benefits.
@article{dahlstrom_corruption_2012,
	title = {Corruption, {Bureaucratic} {Failure} and {Social} {Policy} {Priorities}},
	copyright = {© 2012 The Authors. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association},
	issn = {1467-9248},
	url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00998.x/abstract},
	doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00998.x},
	abstract = {This article argues that bureaucratic capacity – the competence and reliability of the national bureaucracy – matters to the allocation of public spending among welfare state programmes since it is difficult for governments to justify high levels of spending on programmes that require bureaucrats to make case-by-case decisions, on a discretionary basis, if the bureaucracy is incompetent, corrupt or both. We expect bureaucratic capacity to have a positive effect on programmes that involve bureaucratic discretion, but weak or no effects on programmes that are more straightforward to implement. In order to test these hypotheses, we analyse public spending on active labour market programmes (which involve a lot of discretion) and parental leave benefits (which involve less discretion). Relying on data for twenty advanced democracies from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, we find that high bureaucratic capacity does have a positive effect on active labour market policy spending, but not on parental leave benefits.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2012-11-19},
	journal = {Political Studies},
	author = {Dahlström, Carl and Lindvall, Johannes and Rothstein, Bo},
	year = {2012},
	keywords = {bureaucratic discretion, Corruption, quality of government, Social Policy, Welfare state},
	pages = {n/a--n/a},
	file = {Full Text PDF:files/52172/Dahlström et al. - 2013 - Corruption, Bureaucratic Failure and Social Policy.pdf:application/pdf;post998.pdf:files/37259/post998.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:files/52167/abstract\;jsessionid=E5113D4A993FBFFE8170306AD453B9ED.html:text/html}
}

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