On Friedman's look. Daniel E. Flage Hume Studies, 19(1):187–197, 1993. ![On Friedman's look [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex [first paragraph] In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas ofmemory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (3) that I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise frommyreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation ofdistinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise.
@article{DanielE.Flage2011,
abstract = {[first paragraph] In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas ofmemory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (3) that I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise frommyreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation ofdistinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise.},
author = {{Daniel E. Flage}},
doi = {10.1353/hms.2011.0443},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Daniel E. Flage - 1993 - On Friedman's look.pdf:pdf},
issn = {1947-9921},
journal = {Hume Studies},
number = {1},
pages = {187--197},
title = {{On Friedman's look}},
url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/hume{\_}studies/v019/19.1.flage.html},
volume = {19},
year = {1993}
}
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