@article{DeBrigard2012,
abstract = {Clark (in press) has offered a forceful defense of the “hierarchical prediction machine” (HPM) approach to the brain. Roughly, HPM suggests that brains are in the business of making sense of incoming information by generating top-down models aimed at providing the optimal fit for the input data. A better fit between the model and the data minimizes prediction error, which Clark – following Friston (e.g., Friston, 2010) – construes as tantamount to reducing surprisal, i.e., “the subpersonally computed implausibility of some sensory state given the model of the world” (p. 17). Notwithstanding the breadth of his defense, Clark's case is entirely built upon research on perception, attention, and action, all of which are on-line cognitive processes. With practically no mention of offline cognition, the theoretical pretensions of the HPM approach, which Clark so vigorously defends as a “single unifying explanatory framework” (p. 61) in cognitive science, are questionable.},
author = {{De Brigard}, Felipe},
doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/De Brigard - 2012 - Predictive memory and the surprising gap.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1664-1078},
issn = {1664-1078},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
pages = {420},
pmid = {23162493},
title = {{Predictive memory and the surprising gap}},
url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420/abstract},
volume = {3},
year = {2012}
}

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