Barriers within firms to energy-efficient investments. DeCanio, S. J. Energy Policy, 21(9):906--914, September, 1993.
abstract   bibtex   
Many investments in energy efficiency fail to be made despite their apparent profitability. Internal hurdle rates are often set at levels higher than the cost of capital to the firm. Reasons for these practices include bounded rationality, principal-agent problems, and moral hazard. The policy implication is that government can simultaneously improve overall energy efficiency and increase private sector productivity by providing informational and organizational services that go beyond the traditional regulatory framework.
@article{ StephenJ.1993,
  abstract = {Many investments in energy efficiency fail to be made despite their apparent profitability. Internal hurdle rates are often set at levels higher than the cost of capital to the firm. Reasons for these practices include bounded rationality, principal-agent problems, and moral hazard. The policy implication is that government can simultaneously improve overall energy efficiency and increase private sector productivity by providing informational and organizational services that go beyond the traditional regulatory framework.},
  author = {DeCanio, S. J.},
  file = {:Users/adam/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/TBMJ7H32/030142159390178I.html:html;:Users/adam/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/UCBR5U7W/Stephen J. - 1993 - Barriers within firms to energy-efficient investme.pdf:pdf},
  issn = {0301-4215},
  journal = {Energy Policy},
  keywords = {Bounded rationality,Energy efficiency,Principal-agent problem},
  mendeley-tags = {Bounded rationality,Energy efficiency,Principal-agent problem},
  month = {September},
  number = {9},
  pages = {906--914},
  title = {{Barriers within firms to energy-efficient investments}},
  volume = {21},
  year = {1993}
}
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