Original position arguments and social choice under ignorance. De Coninck, T. & Van De Putte, F. Theory and Decision, 94(2):275 – 298, 2023. Publisher: Springer Type: Article![Original position arguments and social choice under ignorance [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex John Rawls famously argued that the Difference Principle would be chosen by any rational agent in the original position. Derek Parfit and Philippe Van Parijs have claimed, contra Rawls, that it is not the Difference Principle which is implied by Rawls’ original position argument, but rather the more refined Lexical Difference Principle. In this paper, we study both principles in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general format for evaluating original position arguments in this context. We argue that in this format, the Difference Principle can be specified in three conceptually distinct ways. We show that these three specifications give the same choice recommendations, and can be grounded in an original position argument in combination with the well-known maximin rule. Analogously, we argue that one can give at least four plausible specifications of the Lexical Difference Principle, which however turn out to give different recommendations in concrete choice scenarios. We prove that only one of these four specifications can be grounded in an original position argument. Moreover, this one specification seems the least appealing from the viewpoint of distributive justice. This insight points towards a general weakness of original position arguments. © 2022, The Author(s).
@article{de_coninck_original_2023,
title = {Original position arguments and social choice under ignorance},
volume = {94},
issn = {00405833},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85131037855&doi=10.1007%2fs11238-022-09889-6&partnerID=40&md5=3742e470c98cd1a32243d54cf394eb61},
doi = {10.1007/s11238-022-09889-6},
abstract = {John Rawls famously argued that the Difference Principle would be chosen by any rational agent in the original position. Derek Parfit and Philippe Van Parijs have claimed, contra Rawls, that it is not the Difference Principle which is implied by Rawls’ original position argument, but rather the more refined Lexical Difference Principle. In this paper, we study both principles in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general format for evaluating original position arguments in this context. We argue that in this format, the Difference Principle can be specified in three conceptually distinct ways. We show that these three specifications give the same choice recommendations, and can be grounded in an original position argument in combination with the well-known maximin rule. Analogously, we argue that one can give at least four plausible specifications of the Lexical Difference Principle, which however turn out to give different recommendations in concrete choice scenarios. We prove that only one of these four specifications can be grounded in an original position argument. Moreover, this one specification seems the least appealing from the viewpoint of distributive justice. This insight points towards a general weakness of original position arguments. © 2022, The Author(s).},
language = {English},
number = {2},
journal = {Theory and Decision},
author = {De Coninck, Thijs and Van De Putte, Frederik},
year = {2023},
note = {Publisher: Springer
Type: Article},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Difference principle, Leximin, Maximin, Original position argument, Rational agents, Social choice, Social choice under ignorance, Specifications},
pages = {275 -- 298},
}
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