A Dilemma for Driver on Virtues of Ignorance. Dolin, J. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2020. doi abstract bibtex For Julia Driver, some virtues involve ignorance. Modesty, for example, is a disposition to underestimate self-worth, and blind charity is a disposition not to see others’ defects. Such “virtues of ignorance,” she argues, serve as counterexamples to the Aristotelian view that virtue requires intellectual excellence. But Driver seems to face a dilemma: if virtues of ignorance involve ignorance of valuable knowledge, then they do not merit virtue status; but if they involve ignorance of trivial knowledge, then they do not preclude intellectual excellence. So, either there are no virtues of ignorance, or there are no virtues of ignorance – at least not the sort of ignorance that precludes intellectual excellence. Virtues of ignorance therefore fail as counterexamples to Aristotelian virtue theory. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.
@article{dolin_dilemma_2020,
title = {A {Dilemma} for {Driver} on {Virtues} of {Ignorance}},
doi = {10.1007/s10677-020-10110-2},
abstract = {For Julia Driver, some virtues involve ignorance. Modesty, for example, is a disposition to underestimate self-worth, and blind charity is a disposition not to see others’ defects. Such “virtues of ignorance,” she argues, serve as counterexamples to the Aristotelian view that virtue requires intellectual excellence. But Driver seems to face a dilemma: if virtues of ignorance involve ignorance of valuable knowledge, then they do not merit virtue status; but if they involve ignorance of trivial knowledge, then they do not preclude intellectual excellence. So, either there are no virtues of ignorance, or there are no virtues of ignorance – at least not the sort of ignorance that precludes intellectual excellence. Virtues of ignorance therefore fail as counterexamples to Aristotelian virtue theory. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.},
journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
author = {Dolin, J.},
year = {2020},
keywords = {Aristotelian virtue theory, Ignorance, Ignorance in philosophy and logic, Julia Driver, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Virtue, Virtues of ignorance},
}
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