Parity, prospects, and predominance. Doody, R. Philosophical Studies, 176(4):1077–1095, April, 2019. ![Parity, prospects, and predominance [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Let’s say that you regard two things as on a par when you don’t prefer one to other and aren’t indifferent between them. What does rationality require of you when choosing between risky options whose outcomes you regard as on a par? According to Prospectism, you are required to choose the option with the best prospects, where an option’s prospects is a probability-distribution over its potential outcomes. In this paper, I argue that Prospectism violates a dominance principle—which I call The Principle of Predominance—because it sometimes requires you to do something that’s no better than the alternatives and might (or even likely) be worse. I argue that this undermines the strongest argument that’s been given in favor of Prospectism.
@article{doody_parity_2019,
title = {Parity, prospects, and predominance},
volume = {176},
issn = {1573-0883},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1048-0},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1048-0},
abstract = {Let’s say that you regard two things as on a par when you don’t prefer one to other and aren’t indifferent between them. What does rationality require of you when choosing between risky options whose outcomes you regard as on a par? According to Prospectism, you are required to choose the option with the best prospects, where an option’s prospects is a probability-distribution over its potential outcomes. In this paper, I argue that Prospectism violates a dominance principle—which I call The Principle of Predominance—because it sometimes requires you to do something that’s no better than the alternatives and might (or even likely) be worse. I argue that this undermines the strongest argument that’s been given in favor of Prospectism.},
language = {en},
number = {4},
urldate = {2020-11-19},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
author = {Doody, Ryan},
month = apr,
year = {2019},
pages = {1077--1095},
}
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