False memories and quasi-memories are memories. Dranseika, V. In Tania, L.; Nichols, S.; and Knobe, J., editors, Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
abstract   bibtex   
[first paragraph] In this report, I present new data bearing on two constraints that are often taken to be essential features of our ordinary use of ‘remembering' and ‘having a memory': the factivity constraint and the strong previous awareness condition.1 Let me introduce these two constraints in turn.
@incollection{Dranseika,
abstract = {[first paragraph] In this report, I present new data bearing on two constraints that are often taken to be essential features of our ordinary use of ‘remembering' and ‘having a memory': the factivity constraint and the strong previous awareness condition.1 Let me introduce these two constraints in turn.},
address = {Oxford},
author = {Dranseika, Vilius},
booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy},
editor = {Tania, Lombrozom and Nichols, Shaun and Knobe, Joshua},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Dranseika - Unknown - False memories and quasi-memories are memories.pdf:pdf},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
title = {{False memories and quasi-memories are memories}},
volume = {3}
}
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