@incollection{Droege2012,
abstract = {A squirrel bustles down the tree into the pachysandra to retrieve an acorn and then scurries back up to sit atop a knot in the bark while it shaves the shell and eats the nut meat. What is it like to be a squirrel? Is there any way to tell unless one is that very squirrel? Many people believe that the essentially private nature of consciousness closes off the possibility that science as an objective, third-person form of investigation could tell us anything about the subjective, first-person experience of an animal. This view is compelling. We are all familiar with the frustration of trying to describe our experiences to someone who has not shared those experiences. (What was Cairo like? There is no adequate answer.) Isn't the difficulty magnified to incomprehension when trying to understand the experience of an animal that does not even have the ability to express itself in language? Equally compelling is the opposite intuition that we can indeed tell that the squirrel is conscious. There is no doubt in my mind that squirrels, dogs, bats and babies are conscious, although I am less sure about fish, octopus, ants and other creatures. How can anything as cute and lively as a squirrel not be conscious? Curiously, the same people who are adamant that consciousness is essentially subjective and inaccessible to third-person explanation are the most vociferous in their defense of animal consciousness. i Why think that animal consciousness is indisputable, yet deny that it is explainable? A brief foray into a current controversy about the memory capacity of scrub-jays suggests the limits of behavioral evidence for animal consciousness. While various forms of behavior serve as indicators of consciousness, more specific content is needed to be completely convinced that},
address = {New York},
author = {Droege, Paula},
booktitle = {Experiencing Animal Minds: An Anthology of Animal-Human Encounters},
editor = {Smith, Julie A. and Mitchell, Robert W.},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Droege - 2012 - Assessing evidence for animal consciousness The question of episodic memory.pdf:pdf},
pages = {231--245},
publisher = {Columbia University Press},
title = {{Assessing evidence for animal consciousness: The question of episodic memory}},
year = {2012}
}

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