Oblivious AQM and Nash Equilibria. Dutta, D., Goel, A., & Heidemann, J. Technical Report 02-764, University of Southern California Computer Science Department, July, 2002. ![Oblivious AQM and Nash Equilibria [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper abstract bibtex An oblivious Active Queue Management scheme is one which does not differentiate between packets belonging to different flows. In this paper, we study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria imposed by oblivious AQM schemes on selfish agents. Oblivious AQM schemes are of obvious importance because of the ease of implementation and deployment, and Nash equilibrium offers valuable clues into network performance under non-cooperative user behavior. Specifically, we ask the following three questions: 1) Do there exist oblivious AQM schemes that impose Nash equilibria on selfish agents? 2) Are the imposed equilibria, if they exist, efficient in terms of the goodput obtained and the drop probability experienced at the equilibrium? 3) How easy is it for selfish users to reach the Nash equilibrium state? We assume that the traffic sources are Poisson but the users can control the average rate. We show that drop-tail and RED do not impose Nash equilibria. We modify RED slightly to obtain an oblivious scheme, VLRED, that imposes a Nash equilibrium, but is not efficient. We then present another AQM policy, EN-AQM, that can impose an efficient Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show that for any oblivious AQM, the Nash equilibrium imposed on selfish agents is highly sensitive as the number of agents increases, thus making it hard for the users to converge to the Nash equilibrium, and motivating the need for equilibria-aware protocols.
@TechReport{Dutta02b,
author = "Debojyoti Dutta and Ashish Goel and John Heidemann",
title = "Oblivious AQM and Nash Equilibria",
institution = "University of Southern California Computer Science Department",
year = 2002,
sortdate = "2002-07-01",
project = "ant, saman",
jsubject = "networking",
number = "02-764",
month = jul,
jlocation = "johnh: folder: xxx",
jlocation = "johnh: pafile",
keywords = "router buffer strategies, nash equilibria",
otherurl = "ftp://ftp.usc.edu/pub/csinfo/tech-reports/papers/02-764.pdf",
url = "https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Dutta02b.html",
psurl = "https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Dutta02b.ps.gz",
pdfurl = "https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Dutta02b.pdf",
otherurl = "ftp://ftp.usc.edu/pub/csinfo/tech-reports/papers/02-764.pdf",
myorganization = "USC/Information Sciences Institute",
abstract = "
An oblivious Active Queue Management scheme is one which does not
differentiate between packets belonging to different flows. In this
paper, we study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria
imposed by oblivious AQM schemes on selfish agents. Oblivious AQM
schemes are of obvious importance because of the ease of
implementation and deployment, and Nash equilibrium offers valuable
clues into network performance under non-cooperative user
behavior. Specifically, we ask the following three questions: 1) Do
there exist oblivious AQM schemes that impose Nash equilibria on
selfish agents? 2) Are the imposed equilibria, if they exist,
efficient in terms of the goodput obtained and the drop probability
experienced at the equilibrium? 3) How easy is it for selfish users
to reach the Nash equilibrium state? We assume that the traffic
sources are Poisson but the users can control the average rate. We
show that drop-tail and RED do not impose Nash equilibria. We modify
RED slightly to obtain an oblivious scheme, VLRED, that imposes a Nash
equilibrium, but is not efficient. We then present another AQM policy,
EN-AQM, that can impose an efficient Nash equilibrium. Finally, we
show that for any oblivious AQM, the Nash equilibrium imposed on
selfish agents is highly sensitive as the number of agents increases,
thus making it hard for the users to converge to the Nash equilibrium,
and motivating the need for equilibria-aware protocols.
",
}
Downloads: 0
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In this paper, we study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria imposed by oblivious AQM schemes on selfish agents. Oblivious AQM schemes are of obvious importance because of the ease of implementation and deployment, and Nash equilibrium offers valuable clues into network performance under non-cooperative user behavior. Specifically, we ask the following three questions: 1) Do there exist oblivious AQM schemes that impose Nash equilibria on selfish agents? 2) Are the imposed equilibria, if they exist, efficient in terms of the goodput obtained and the drop probability experienced at the equilibrium? 3) How easy is it for selfish users to reach the Nash equilibrium state? We assume that the traffic sources are Poisson but the users can control the average rate. We show that drop-tail and RED do not impose Nash equilibria. We modify RED slightly to obtain an oblivious scheme, VLRED, that imposes a Nash equilibrium, but is not efficient. We then present another AQM policy, EN-AQM, that can impose an efficient Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show that for any oblivious AQM, the Nash equilibrium imposed on selfish agents is highly sensitive as the number of agents increases, thus making it hard for the users to converge to the Nash equilibrium, and motivating the need for equilibria-aware protocols. ","bibtex":"@TechReport{Dutta02b,\n\tauthor = \t\"Debojyoti Dutta and Ashish Goel and John Heidemann\",\n\ttitle = \t\"Oblivious AQM and Nash Equilibria\",\n\tinstitution = \t\"University of Southern California Computer Science Department\",\n\tyear = \t\t2002,\n\tsortdate = \t\"2002-07-01\", \n\tproject = \"ant, saman\",\n\tjsubject = \"networking\",\n\tnumber =\t\"02-764\",\n\tmonth =\t\tjul,\n\tjlocation =\t\"johnh: folder: xxx\",\n\tjlocation =\t\"johnh: pafile\",\n\tkeywords =\t\"router buffer strategies, nash equilibria\",\n\totherurl =\t\t\"ftp://ftp.usc.edu/pub/csinfo/tech-reports/papers/02-764.pdf\",\n\turl =\t\t\"https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Dutta02b.html\",\n\tpsurl =\t\t\"https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Dutta02b.ps.gz\",\n\tpdfurl =\t\"https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Dutta02b.pdf\",\n\totherurl = \t\"ftp://ftp.usc.edu/pub/csinfo/tech-reports/papers/02-764.pdf\",\n\tmyorganization =\t\"USC/Information Sciences Institute\",\n\tabstract = \"\nAn oblivious Active Queue Management scheme is one which does not\ndifferentiate between packets belonging to different flows. In this\npaper, we study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria\nimposed by oblivious AQM schemes on selfish agents. Oblivious AQM\nschemes are of obvious importance because of the ease of\nimplementation and deployment, and Nash equilibrium offers valuable\nclues into network performance under non-cooperative user\nbehavior. Specifically, we ask the following three questions: 1) Do\nthere exist oblivious AQM schemes that impose Nash equilibria on\nselfish agents? 2) Are the imposed equilibria, if they exist,\nefficient in terms of the goodput obtained and the drop probability\nexperienced at the equilibrium? 3) How easy is it for selfish users\nto reach the Nash equilibrium state? We assume that the traffic\nsources are Poisson but the users can control the average rate. We\nshow that drop-tail and RED do not impose Nash equilibria. We modify\nRED slightly to obtain an oblivious scheme, VLRED, that imposes a Nash\nequilibrium, but is not efficient. We then present another AQM policy,\nEN-AQM, that can impose an efficient Nash equilibrium. Finally, we\nshow that for any oblivious AQM, the Nash equilibrium imposed on\nselfish agents is highly sensitive as the number of agents increases,\nthus making it hard for the users to converge to the Nash equilibrium,\nand motivating the need for equilibria-aware protocols.\n\",\n}\n\n","author_short":["Dutta, D.","Goel, A.","Heidemann, J."],"bibbaseid":"dutta-goel-heidemann-obliviousaqmandnashequilibria-2002","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Dutta02b.html"},"keyword":["router buffer strategies","nash equilibria"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}}},"bibtype":"techreport","biburl":"https://bibbase.org/f/dHevizJoWEhWowz8q/johnh-2023-2.bib","dataSources":["YLyu3mj3xsBeoqiHK","fLZcDgNSoSuatv6aX","fxEParwu2ZfurScPY","7nuQvtHTqKrLmgu99"],"keywords":["router buffer strategies","nash equilibria"],"search_terms":["oblivious","aqm","nash","equilibria","dutta","goel","heidemann"],"title":"Oblivious AQM and Nash Equilibria","year":2002}