Contracts versus Salaries in Matching. Echenique, F. The American Economic Review, 102(1):594-601, American Economic Association, 2012.
Contracts versus Salaries in Matching [link]Paper  abstract   bibtex   
Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. (JEL C78, D86, J31, J41)
@article{10.2307/41408786,
 ISSN = {00028282},
 URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/41408786},
 author = {Federico Echenique},
 journal = {The American Economic Review},
 number = {1},
 pages = {594-601},
 publisher = {American Economic Association},
 title = {Contracts versus Salaries in Matching},
 volume = {102},
abstract = {Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. (JEL C78, D86, J31, J41)},
 year = {2012}
}
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