Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings. Echenique, F., Lee, S., Shum, M., & Yenmez, M. B. Games, 2021.
Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as the median stable matching.
@Article{g12020033,
AUTHOR = {Echenique, Federico and Lee, SangMok and Shum, Matthew and Yenmez, M. Bumin},
TITLE = {Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings},
JOURNAL = {Games},
VOLUME = {12},
YEAR = {2021},
NUMBER = {2},
ARTICLE-NUMBER = {33},
URL = {https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/33},
ISSN = {2073-4336},
ABSTRACT = {We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as the median stable matching.},
DOI = {10.3390/g12020033}
}

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