@article{ECHENIQUE2023428,
title = {Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
volume = {141},
pages = {428-443},
year = {2023},
issn = {0899-8256},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.002},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825623000957},
author = {Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles and Jun Zhang},
keywords = {Discrete allocation, Endowment, Pseudo-market procedure, Balanced individual rationality},
abstract = {In a variant of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)'s model that allows agents to start out with different endowments, we develop a pseudo-market procedure that allows the policymaker to decide to what extent individual endowment differences shall be balanced by the average endowment. Our procedure sidesteps the known non-existence problem of Walrasian equilibria, and finds an efficient and balanced individually-rational allocation. Envy in our procedure is justified in a utilitarian sense: an envying agent's endowment must make a lower contribution to standard weighted utilitarian welfare than that of the envied agent.}
}

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