@article{10.2307/25151884,
 ISSN = {0364765X, 15265471},
 URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25151884},
 abstract = {This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsifiable. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.},
 author = {Federico Echenique},
 journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},
 number = {3},
 pages = {757-768},
 publisher = {INFORMS},
 title = {What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory},
 volume = {33},
 year = {2008}
}

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