What Ignorance Really Is. Examining the Foundations of Epistemology of Ignorance. El Kassar, N. Social Epistemology, 32(5):300–310, September, 2018. Number: 5 Publisher: Routledge _eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2018.1518498
What Ignorance Really Is. Examining the Foundations of Epistemology of Ignorance [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
Recent years have seen a surge in publications about the epistemology of ignorance. In this article, I examine the proliferation of the concept ignorance that has come with the increased interest in the topic. I identify three conceptions of ignorance in the current literature: (1) ignorance as lack of knowledge/true belief, (2) ignorance as actively upheld false outlooks and (3) ignorance as substantive epistemic practice. These different conceptions of ignorance are as of yet unacknowledged but are bound to impede epistemology of ignorance and, therefore, need to be uncovered. After discussing three unsuccessful ways of dealing with these varying conceptions, I put forward an integrated conception of ignorance that is more adequate for serving as the foundation of epistemology of ignorance. Introducing an alternative conception of ignorance provides us with a foundation for both epistemological and more broadly philosophical work on ignorance.
@article{el_kassar_what_2018,
	title = {What {Ignorance} {Really} {Is}. {Examining} the {Foundations} of {Epistemology} of {Ignorance}},
	volume = {32},
	issn = {0269-1728},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2018.1518498},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2018.1518498},
	abstract = {Recent years have seen a surge in publications about the epistemology of ignorance. In this article, I examine the proliferation of the concept ignorance that has come with the increased interest in the topic. I identify three conceptions of ignorance in the current literature: (1) ignorance as lack of knowledge/true belief, (2) ignorance as actively upheld false outlooks and (3) ignorance as substantive epistemic practice. These different conceptions of ignorance are as of yet unacknowledged but are bound to impede epistemology of ignorance and, therefore, need to be uncovered. After discussing three unsuccessful ways of dealing with these varying conceptions, I put forward an integrated conception of ignorance that is more adequate for serving as the foundation of epistemology of ignorance. Introducing an alternative conception of ignorance provides us with a foundation for both epistemological and more broadly philosophical work on ignorance.},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2023-12-22},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {El Kassar, Nadja},
	month = sep,
	year = {2018},
	note = {Number: 5
Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2018.1518498},
	keywords = {Ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier), epistemology of ignorance, revisionary epistemology},
	pages = {300--310},
}

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