Iterated Regret Minimization in Voting Games. Emery, M. & Wilson, M. C. In COMSOC 2014, Pittsburgh, June 23-25, 2014, pages 12pp, 2014.
Iterated Regret Minimization in Voting Games [pdf]Paper  abstract   bibtex   3 downloads  
The game-theoretic solution concept Iterated Regret Minimization (IRM) was introduced recently by Halpern and Pass. We give the first application of IRM to simultaneous voting games. We study positional scoring rules in detail and give theoretical results demonstrating the bias of IRM toward sincere voting. We present comprehensive simulation results of the effect on social welfare of IRM compared to both sincere and optimal voting. The results fit into a broader research theme of the welfare consequences of strategic voting.

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