@article{ervas_metaphor_2019,
	title = {Metaphor, ignorance and the sentiment of (ir)rationality},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02489-y},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02489-y},
	abstract = {Metaphor has been considered as a cognitive process, independent of the verbal versus visual mode, through which an unknown conceptual domain is understood in terms of another known conceptual domain. Metaphor might instead be viewed as a cognitive process, dependent on the mode, which leads to genuinely new knowledge via ignorance. First, I argue that there are two main senses of ignorance at stake when we understand a metaphor: (1) we ignore some existing properties of the known domain in the sense that we disregard or neglect them; (2) we ignore some “non-existing” properties of the known domain in the sense that they are not a piece of information belonging to the known domain, but emerge in metaphor interpretation. Secondly, I consider a metaphor as a reasoning device, guiding the interpreters along a path of inferences to a conclusion, which attributes to the target some properties of the source. In this path, interpreters might (1) (re)discover the ignored existing properties of the known domain and/or (2) recover the “non-existing” properties, inferring or imagining the missing piece of information. Finally, I argue that, especially in visual metaphors, this process is guided by a “sentiment of (ir)rationality”, tracking a disruption of existing familiar conceptualisations of objects and/or actions and a (partial) recovery of ignored properties.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2020-10-29},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Ervas, Francesca},
	month = nov,
	year = {2019},
}

{"_id":"YeHWXNX6PTmZ7ZeX6","bibbaseid":"ervas-metaphorignoranceandthesentimentofirrationality-2019","author_short":["Ervas, F."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"Metaphor, ignorance and the sentiment of (ir)rationality","issn":"1573-0964","url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02489-y","doi":"10.1007/s11229-019-02489-y","abstract":"Metaphor has been considered as a cognitive process, independent of the verbal versus visual mode, through which an unknown conceptual domain is understood in terms of another known conceptual domain. Metaphor might instead be viewed as a cognitive process, dependent on the mode, which leads to genuinely new knowledge via ignorance. First, I argue that there are two main senses of ignorance at stake when we understand a metaphor: (1) we ignore some existing properties of the known domain in the sense that we disregard or neglect them; (2) we ignore some “non-existing” properties of the known domain in the sense that they are not a piece of information belonging to the known domain, but emerge in metaphor interpretation. Secondly, I consider a metaphor as a reasoning device, guiding the interpreters along a path of inferences to a conclusion, which attributes to the target some properties of the source. In this path, interpreters might (1) (re)discover the ignored existing properties of the known domain and/or (2) recover the “non-existing” properties, inferring or imagining the missing piece of information. Finally, I argue that, especially in visual metaphors, this process is guided by a “sentiment of (ir)rationality”, tracking a disruption of existing familiar conceptualisations of objects and/or actions and a (partial) recovery of ignored properties.","language":"en","urldate":"2020-10-29","journal":"Synthese","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Ervas"],"firstnames":["Francesca"],"suffixes":[]}],"month":"November","year":"2019","bibtex":"@article{ervas_metaphor_2019,\n\ttitle = {Metaphor, ignorance and the sentiment of (ir)rationality},\n\tissn = {1573-0964},\n\turl = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02489-y},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02489-y},\n\tabstract = {Metaphor has been considered as a cognitive process, independent of the verbal versus visual mode, through which an unknown conceptual domain is understood in terms of another known conceptual domain. Metaphor might instead be viewed as a cognitive process, dependent on the mode, which leads to genuinely new knowledge via ignorance. First, I argue that there are two main senses of ignorance at stake when we understand a metaphor: (1) we ignore some existing properties of the known domain in the sense that we disregard or neglect them; (2) we ignore some “non-existing” properties of the known domain in the sense that they are not a piece of information belonging to the known domain, but emerge in metaphor interpretation. Secondly, I consider a metaphor as a reasoning device, guiding the interpreters along a path of inferences to a conclusion, which attributes to the target some properties of the source. In this path, interpreters might (1) (re)discover the ignored existing properties of the known domain and/or (2) recover the “non-existing” properties, inferring or imagining the missing piece of information. Finally, I argue that, especially in visual metaphors, this process is guided by a “sentiment of (ir)rationality”, tracking a disruption of existing familiar conceptualisations of objects and/or actions and a (partial) recovery of ignored properties.},\n\tlanguage = {en},\n\turldate = {2020-10-29},\n\tjournal = {Synthese},\n\tauthor = {Ervas, Francesca},\n\tmonth = nov,\n\tyear = {2019},\n}\n\n","author_short":["Ervas, F."],"key":"ervas_metaphor_2019","id":"ervas_metaphor_2019","bibbaseid":"ervas-metaphorignoranceandthesentimentofirrationality-2019","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02489-y"},"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}}},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://bibbase.org/zotero-group/science_et_ignorance/1340424","dataSources":["zX4acseCDM6D58AW7"],"keywords":[],"search_terms":["metaphor","ignorance","sentiment","rationality","ervas"],"title":"Metaphor, ignorance and the sentiment of (ir)rationality","year":2019}