A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective. Falleti, T. G. American Political Science Review, null(03):327--346, August, 2005. ![A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments. however, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant. in this article, i propose a sequential theory of decentralization that has three main characteristics: (1) it defines decentralization as a process, (2) it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors, and (3) it incorporates policy feedback effects. i argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. i measure this evolution in the four largest latin american countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases (colombia and argentina). i show that, contrary to commonly held opinion, decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors.
@article{falleti_sequential_2005,
title = {A {Sequential} {Theory} of {Decentralization}: {Latin} {American} {Cases} in {Comparative} {Perspective}},
volume = {null},
issn = {1537-5943},
shorttitle = {A {Sequential} {Theory} of {Decentralization}},
url = {http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0003055405051695},
doi = {10.1017/S0003055405051695},
abstract = {both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments. however, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant. in this article, i propose a sequential theory of decentralization that has three main characteristics: (1) it defines decentralization as a process, (2) it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors, and (3) it incorporates policy feedback effects. i argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. i measure this evolution in the four largest latin american countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases (colombia and argentina). i show that, contrary to commonly held opinion, decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors.},
number = {03},
urldate = {2016-07-19},
journal = {American Political Science Review},
author = {Falleti, Tulia G.},
month = aug,
year = {2005},
pages = {327--346},
file = {Cambridge Journals Snapshot:files/56098/displayAbstract.html:text/html;Falleti_APSR99.3_SeqDecent.pdf:files/56099/Falleti_APSR99.3_SeqDecent.pdf:application/pdf}
}
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