Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. Feldman, M., Papadimitriou, C., Chuang, J., & Stoica, I. 08/2004 2004. ![Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex We develop a model to study the phenomenon of free-riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. At the heart of our model is a user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user\textquoterights willingness to contribute resources to the system. A user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current contribution cost in the system compares to her type. When the societal generosity (i.e., the average type) is low, intervention is required in order to sustain the system. We present the effect of mechanisms that exclude low type users or, more realistic, penalize free-riders with degraded service. We also consider dynamic scenarios with arrivals and departures of users, and with whitewashers: users who leave the system and rejoin with new identities to avoid reputational penalties. We find that when penalty is imposed on all newcomers in order to avoid whitewashing, system performance degrades significantly only when the turnover rate among users is high.
@conference {Feldman:2004:FWP:1016527.1016539,
title = {Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems},
booktitle = {PINS{\textquoteright}04. Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Practice and Theory of Incentives in Networked Systems},
series = {PINS {\textquoteright}04},
year = {2004},
month = {08/2004},
pages = {228{\textendash}236},
publisher = {ACM},
organization = {ACM},
address = {Portland, OR},
abstract = {We develop a model to study the phenomenon of free-riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. At the heart of our model is a user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user{\textquoteright}s willingness to contribute resources to the system. A user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current contribution cost in the system compares to her type. When the societal generosity (i.e., the average type) is low, intervention is required in order to sustain the system. We present the effect of mechanisms that exclude low type users or, more realistic, penalize free-riders with degraded service. We also consider dynamic scenarios with arrivals and departures of users, and with whitewashers: users who leave the system and rejoin with new identities to avoid reputational penalties. We find that when penalty is imposed on all newcomers in order to avoid whitewashing, system performance degrades significantly only when the turnover rate among users is high.},
keywords = {cheap pseudonyms, cooperation, equilibrium, exclusion, free-riding, identity cost, incentives, peer-to-peer networking, whitewashing},
isbn = {1-58113-942-X},
doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1016527.1016539},
url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1016527.1016539},
author = {Michal Feldman and Papadimitriou, Christos and John Chuang and Ion Stoica}
}
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