Externalism, self-knowledge and memory. Fernández, J. In Externalism and Skepticism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016. abstract bibtex [first paragraph] This chapter discusses Paul Boghossian's ‘memory argument' for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. The argument raises the question of whether, assuming externalism, the contents of our past thoughts are accessible to us through memory or not. I concede that there is a sense in which memory does not give us access to the contents of our past thoughts if externalism holds. However, I argue that, in the relevant sense, the view that the contents of our past thoughts are inaccessible to memory cannot be used to establish incompatibilism through the memory argument. Drawing on some tools from two-dimensional semantics, I suggest that one of the premises in the argument trades on an ambiguity between two notions of mental content.
@incollection{Fernandez2016a,
abstract = {[first paragraph] This chapter discusses Paul Boghossian's ‘memory argument' for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. The argument raises the question of whether, assuming externalism, the contents of our past thoughts are accessible to us through memory or not. I concede that there is a sense in which memory does not give us access to the contents of our past thoughts if externalism holds. However, I argue that, in the relevant sense, the view that the contents of our past thoughts are inaccessible to memory cannot be used to establish incompatibilism through the memory argument. Drawing on some tools from two-dimensional semantics, I suggest that one of the premises in the argument trades on an ambiguity between two notions of mental content.},
address = {Cambridge},
author = {Fern{\'{a}}ndez, Jordi},
booktitle = {Externalism and Skepticism},
editor = {Goldberg, Sanford C.},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Fern{\'{a}}ndez - 2016 - Externalism, self-knowledge and memory.pdf:pdf},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {{Externalism, self-knowledge and memory}},
year = {2016}
}
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