@incollection{Fernandez2018,
abstract = {[first paragraph] The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something?1 The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining that features those mental states that qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states that do not qualify as such typically lack. I will proceed as follows.},
address = {New York},
author = {Fern{\'{a}}ndez, Jordi},
booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Fern{\'{a}}ndez - 2018 - The functional character of memory.pdf:pdf},
pages = {52--71},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{The functional character of memory}},
year = {2018}
}

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