Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl's phenomenology. Feyles, M. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(4):727–746, 2013.
Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl's phenomenology [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl's position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory. \textcopyright 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
@article{Feyles2013,
abstract = {The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl's position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory. {\textcopyright} 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.},
author = {Feyles, Martino},
doi = {10.1007/s11097-012-9283-x},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Feyles - 2013 - Recollection and phantasy The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl's phenomenology.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1109701292},
issn = {1568-7759},
journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
number = {4},
pages = {727--746},
title = {{Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl's phenomenology}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-012-9283-x},
volume = {12},
year = {2013}
}
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