The Virtue Epistemology of Maria Montessori. Frierson, P. R. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(1):79–98, 2016.
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This paper shows how Maria Montessori's thought can enrich contemporary virtue epistemology. After a short overview of her ‘interested empiricist’ epistemological framework, I discuss four representative intellectual virtues: sensory acuity, physical dexterity, intellectual love, and intellectual humility. Throughout, I show how Montessori bridges the divide between reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to the virtues and how her particular treatments of virtues offer distinctive and compelling alternatives to contemporary accounts. For instance, she emphasizes how sensory acuity is a virtue for which one can be responsible, highlights the embodied nature of cognition through a focus on physical dexterity, interprets intellectual love as a way of loving the world rather than as a love that takes knowledge as its object, and presents an alternative account of intellectual humility to contemporary emphases on the interpersonal dimensions of this virtue.
@article{frierson_virtue_2016,
	title = {The {Virtue} {Epistemology} of {Maria} {Montessori}},
	volume = {94},
	issn = {0004-8402},
	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2015.1036895},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1036895},
	abstract = {This paper shows how Maria Montessori's thought can enrich contemporary virtue epistemology. After a short overview of her ‘interested empiricist’ epistemological framework, I discuss four representative intellectual virtues: sensory acuity, physical dexterity, intellectual love, and intellectual humility. Throughout, I show how Montessori bridges the divide between reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to the virtues and how her particular treatments of virtues offer distinctive and compelling alternatives to contemporary accounts. For instance, she emphasizes how sensory acuity is a virtue for which one can be responsible, highlights the embodied nature of cognition through a focus on physical dexterity, interprets intellectual love as a way of loving the world rather than as a love that takes knowledge as its object, and presents an alternative account of intellectual humility to contemporary emphases on the interpersonal dimensions of this virtue.},
	language = {eng},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Frierson, Patrick R.},
	year = {2016},
	keywords = {Maria Montessori, virtue epistemology, embodied cognition},
	pages = {79--98}
}
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