No need to know. Frise, M. Philosophical Studies, 174(2):391–401, 2017. Paper doi abstract bibtex I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
@article{Frise2017,
abstract = {I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.},
author = {Frise, Matthew},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Frise - 2017 - No need to know.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0031-8116},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
number = {2},
pages = {391--401},
title = {{No need to know}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1},
volume = {174},
year = {2017}
}
Downloads: 0
{"_id":"FXpSDrHE4fn8ETLZe","bibbaseid":"frise-noneedtoknow-2017","downloads":0,"creationDate":"2019-01-05T09:36:46.959Z","title":"No need to know","author_short":["Frise, M."],"year":2017,"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://phil-mem.org/phil-mem.bib/","bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","abstract":"I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Frise"],"firstnames":["Matthew"],"suffixes":[]}],"doi":"10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1","file":":Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Frise - 2017 - No need to know.pdf:pdf","issn":"0031-8116","journal":"Philosophical Studies","number":"2","pages":"391–401","title":"No need to know","url":"http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1","volume":"174","year":"2017","bibtex":"@article{Frise2017,\nabstract = {I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.},\nauthor = {Frise, Matthew},\ndoi = {10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1},\nfile = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Frise - 2017 - No need to know.pdf:pdf},\nissn = {0031-8116},\njournal = {Philosophical Studies},\nnumber = {2},\npages = {391--401},\ntitle = {{No need to know}},\nurl = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1},\nvolume = {174},\nyear = {2017}\n}\n","author_short":["Frise, M."],"key":"Frise2017","id":"Frise2017","bibbaseid":"frise-noneedtoknow-2017","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1"},"downloads":0},"search_terms":["need","know","frise"],"keywords":[],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["xpm4HPGis5kQeHY7z"]}