Embodied knowledge - embodied memory. Fuchs, T. In Rinofner-Kreidl, S. & Wiltsche, H. A, editors, Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, pages 215–229. De Gruyter, Berlin, 2016.
abstract   bibtex   
The distinction between representational and embodied knowledge (knowing-that versus knowing-how) has gained new significancethrough the investigation of implicit memory.This kind of memory is formedi nt he course of the interactiono fo rganism and environment: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor,b ut also affect-motor schemes. We mays peako fa ni mplicit "bodym emory" that underlies our habits and skills, connectingb odya nd environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actualizedbysuitable situations or by overarching volitional acts, without necessarilyb eing madee xplicit. The paper analyses the structure of embodied knowledge by taking the example of learning social skills through dyadic interactions in earlyc hildhood. It argues that the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basisofintercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowing others ("theory of mind")are derivedfrom later steps of development ;t hey are not sufficient for explaining the interactive and empathic human capacities.This will finally be illustrated by the example of autism.
@incollection{Fuchs2016,
abstract = {The distinction between representational and embodied knowledge (knowing-that versus knowing-how) has gained new significancethrough the investigation of implicit memory.This kind of memory is formedi nt he course of the interactiono fo rganism and environment: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor,b ut also affect-motor schemes. We mays peako fa ni mplicit "bodym emory" that underlies our habits and skills, connectingb odya nd environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actualizedbysuitable situations or by overarching volitional acts, without necessarilyb eing madee xplicit. The paper analyses the structure of embodied knowledge by taking the example of learning social skills through dyadic interactions in earlyc hildhood. It argues that the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basisofintercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowing others ("theory of mind")are derivedfrom later steps of development ;t hey are not sufficient for explaining the interactive and empathic human capacities.This will finally be illustrated by the example of autism.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Fuchs, Thomas},
booktitle = {Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium},
editor = {Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja and Wiltsche, Harald A},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Fuchs - 2016 - Embodied knowledge - embodied memory.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {9783110450651},
pages = {215--229},
publisher = {De Gruyter},
title = {{Embodied knowledge - embodied memory}},
year = {2016}
}
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