The empiricist theory of memory. Furlong, E. J. Mind, 65(1):542–547, 1956. ![The empiricist theory of memory [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex [first paragraph] MR. HOLLAND'S able and provocative attack on what he terms the Empiricist Theory of Memory (MIND, October 1954) deserves dis- cussion. By the ETM he means the view he attributes to such people as Hume, Bergson, Russell, Broad, Harrod, Woozley and myself. The gist of his criticism is this. The ' empiricists' have sought for what Holland calls a ' memory-indicator ', i.e. a feature of experience that would distinguish remembering from imagining. Hume's indicator will not do. The Russell suggestion that the notion of familiarity gives what we need is little better. In fact, the quest for a memory-indicator is vain. Again, the empiricists have erred in their treatment of sceptical arguments about memory. They have given the sceptic too much scope, for they have allowed that all our judgments, whether made in the laboratory or in the market-place, are based on memory. But this, Holland affirms, is a mistake. It is not by memory, at least as the term is ordinarily used, that we know grass to be green, or snow white. We just know it. Another error of the empiricists is their neglect of image- less memory, a neglect which is due to their preoccupation with a misleading analogy between memory and perception.
@article{Furlong1956,
abstract = {[first paragraph] MR. HOLLAND'S able and provocative attack on what he terms the Empiricist Theory of Memory (MIND, October 1954) deserves dis- cussion. By the ETM he means the view he attributes to such people as Hume, Bergson, Russell, Broad, Harrod, Woozley and myself. The gist of his criticism is this. The ' empiricists' have sought for what Holland calls a ' memory-indicator ', i.e. a feature of experience that would distinguish remembering from imagining. Hume's indicator will not do. The Russell suggestion that the notion of familiarity gives what we need is little better. In fact, the quest for a memory-indicator is vain. Again, the empiricists have erred in their treatment of sceptical arguments about memory. They have given the sceptic too much scope, for they have allowed that all our judgments, whether made in the laboratory or in the market-place, are based on memory. But this, Holland affirms, is a mistake. It is not by memory, at least as the term is ordinarily used, that we know grass to be green, or snow white. We just know it. Another error of the empiricists is their neglect of image- less memory, a neglect which is due to their preoccupation with a misleading analogy between memory and perception.},
author = {Furlong, E. J.},
doi = {10.1093/mind/65.1.542},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Furlong - 1956 - The empiricist theory of memory.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0026-4423},
journal = {Mind},
number = {1},
pages = {542--547},
title = {{The empiricist theory of memory}},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/65/1/542/944178 https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/mind/65.1.542},
volume = {65},
year = {1956}
}
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