Classical Indian philosophy. Ganeri, J. In Bernecker, S. & Michaelian, K., editors, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, pages 408–415. Routledge, New York, 2017. abstract bibtex [first paragraph] There is a deep conceptual link between time and the self. One venerable articulation of the relation has it that memory provides a criterion of personal identity, to which a standard objection has long been that memory presupposes sameness of self and so cannot be used in a non-circular analysis of it. The force of the objection is acknowledged in the move by those theorists who argue that personal identity is instead to be analyzed in terms, not of memory, but of the artificial notion of quasi-memory (the notion of a state that is like memory in being produced by an earlier experience, but neutral about whose experience it was). Both psychological continuity theorists of personal identity and their opponents agree that there is a more basic tie between time and the self, which I will call the “self-implication requirement on memory”.
@incollection{Ganeri2017b,
abstract = {[first paragraph] There is a deep conceptual link between time and the self. One venerable articulation of the relation has it that memory provides a criterion of personal identity, to which a standard objection has long been that memory presupposes sameness of self and so cannot be used in a non-circular analysis of it. The force of the objection is acknowledged in the move by those theorists who argue that personal identity is instead to be analyzed in terms, not of memory, but of the artificial notion of quasi-memory (the notion of a state that is like memory in being produced by an earlier experience, but neutral about whose experience it was). Both psychological continuity theorists of personal identity and their opponents agree that there is a more basic tie between time and the self, which I will call the “self-implication requirement on memory”.},
address = {New York},
author = {Ganeri, Jonardon},
booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Ganeri - 2017 - Classical Indian philosophy.pdf:pdf},
pages = {408--415},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{Classical Indian philosophy}},
year = {2017}
}
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