Overridingness, Moral

Overridingness, Moral. Gert, J. In International Encyclopedia of Ethics. American Cancer Society, 2013.

Morality is one normative domain among many. That is, not only can we assess actions as morally right or wrong, or as morally good or bad, but we can also assess them as legal or illegal, prudent or imprudent, or as prohibited or required by the rules of etiquette. It is quite obvious that these assessments need not always favor and disfavor precisely the same actions. For example, it might be morally required in some cases to perform an action that is prohibited by law, or – some might suggest – it might be imprudent to do something morally good. The thesis of moral overridingness is the thesis that moral verdicts are always in some sense supreme whenever they come into conflict with the verdicts of a distinct normative domain. This general thesis can be understood in a number of ways. To begin with, we need to offer an interpretation of the claim that one verdict overrides another. One might interpret this claim as entailing that, in conflicts of verdicts, it is irrational to go against the moral verdict (see Rationality). Or, one might interpret it as the claim that the totality of practical reasons, taken together, always uniquely favors acting in line with a moral verdict, even though it may not always be irrational to act in ways that are not uniquely favored in this way (see Reasons; Satisficing). In making the overridingness thesis clear, one also needs to specify which verdicts are relevant. Very often, the thesis is understood as restricted to claims about conflicts of requirements. This is an important restriction, since morality can yield the verdict that an action would be morally good without being morally required. For example, in many views, we are not morally required to volunteer our free time doing charitable activity. In such views, morality favors such action, but does not require it (see Supererogation). On a common interpretation of the overridingness thesis, the fact that morality favors such action does not imply that there would be anything problematic in deciding against such a morally good action, and performing some other action instead: say, an action that would do a better job of promoting one's own interests.

@incollection{gert_overridingness_2013,
	title = {Overridingness, {Moral}},
	isbn = {978-1-4443-6707-2},
	url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee010},
	abstract = {Morality is one normative domain among many. That is, not only can we assess actions as morally right or wrong, or as morally good or bad, but we can also assess them as legal or illegal, prudent or imprudent, or as prohibited or required by the rules of etiquette. It is quite obvious that these assessments need not always favor and disfavor precisely the same actions. For example, it might be morally required in some cases to perform an action that is prohibited by law, or – some might suggest – it might be imprudent to do something morally good. The thesis of moral overridingness is the thesis that moral verdicts are always in some sense supreme whenever they come into conflict with the verdicts of a distinct normative domain. This general thesis can be understood in a number of ways. To begin with, we need to offer an interpretation of the claim that one verdict overrides another. One might interpret this claim as entailing that, in conflicts of verdicts, it is irrational to go against the moral verdict (see Rationality). Or, one might interpret it as the claim that the totality of practical reasons, taken together, always uniquely favors acting in line with a moral verdict, even though it may not always be irrational to act in ways that are not uniquely favored in this way (see Reasons; Satisficing). In making the overridingness thesis clear, one also needs to specify which verdicts are relevant. Very often, the thesis is understood as restricted to claims about conflicts of requirements. This is an important restriction, since morality can yield the verdict that an action would be morally good without being morally required. For example, in many views, we are not morally required to volunteer our free time doing charitable activity. In such views, morality favors such action, but does not require it (see Supererogation). On a common interpretation of the overridingness thesis, the fact that morality favors such action does not imply that there would be anything problematic in deciding against such a morally good action, and performing some other action instead: say, an action that would do a better job of promoting one's own interests.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-06-24},
	booktitle = {International {Encyclopedia} of {Ethics}},
	publisher = {American Cancer Society},
	author = {Gert, Joshua},
	year = {2013},
	doi = {10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee010},
	keywords = {altruism, categorical imperative, consequentialism, impartiality, metaethics, moral status, practical reason},
}

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The thesis of moral overridingness is the thesis that moral verdicts are always in some sense supreme whenever they come into conflict with the verdicts of a distinct normative domain. This general thesis can be understood in a number of ways. To begin with, we need to offer an interpretation of the claim that one verdict overrides another. One might interpret this claim as entailing that, in conflicts of verdicts, it is irrational to go against the moral verdict (see Rationality). Or, one might interpret it as the claim that the totality of practical reasons, taken together, always uniquely favors acting in line with a moral verdict, even though it may not always be irrational to act in ways that are not uniquely favored in this way (see Reasons; Satisficing). In making the overridingness thesis clear, one also needs to specify which verdicts are relevant. Very often, the thesis is understood as restricted to claims about conflicts of requirements. 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