Soft Constraints for Security Protocol Analysis: Confidentiality. Giampaolo, B. & Bistarelli, S. 2001. doi abstract bibtex We model any network configuration arising from the execution of a security protocol as a soft constraint satisfaction problem (SCSP). We formalise the protocol goal of confidentiality as a property of the solution for an SCSP, hence confidentiality always holds with a certain security level. The policySCSP models the network configuration where all admissible protocol sessions have terminated successfully, and an imputable SCSP models a given network configuration. Comparing the solutions of these two problems elicits whether the given configuration hides a confidentiality attack. We can also compare attacks and decide which is the most significant. The approach is demonstrated on the asymmetric Needham-Schroeder protocol.
@conference{
11391_142683,
author = {Giampaolo, Bella and Bistarelli, Stefano},
title = {Soft Constraints for Security Protocol Analysis: Confidentiality},
year = {2001},
publisher = {Springer},
volume = {1990},
booktitle = {Practical Aspects of Declarative Languages, Third International Symposium, PADL 2001},
abstract = {We model any network configuration arising from the execution of a security protocol as a soft constraint satisfaction problem (SCSP). We formalise the protocol goal of confidentiality as a property of the solution for an SCSP, hence confidentiality always holds with a certain security level. The policySCSP models the network configuration where all admissible protocol sessions have terminated successfully, and an imputable SCSP models a given network configuration. Comparing the solutions of these two problems elicits whether the given configuration hides a confidentiality attack. We can also compare attacks and decide which is the most significant. The approach is demonstrated on the asymmetric Needham-Schroeder protocol.},
doi = {10.1007/3-540-45241-9_8},
pages = {108--122}
}
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