Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility. Gibbard, A. & Harper, W. L. In Harper, W. L., Stalnaker, R., & Pearce, G., editors, IFS: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time, of The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, pages 153–190. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, 1981. ![Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex We begin with a rough theory of rational decision-making. In the first place, rational decision-making involves conditional propositions: when a person weighs a major decision, it is rational for him to ask, for each act he considers, what would happen if he performed that act. It is rational, then, for him to consider propositions of the form ‘If I were to do a, then c would happen’. Such a proposition we shall call a counterfactual, and we shall form counterfactuals with a connective ‘☐→' on this pattern: ‘If I were to do a, then c would happen’ is to be written ‘I do a ‘☐→' c happens’.
@incollection{gibbard_counterfactuals_1981,
address = {Dordrecht},
series = {The {University} of {Western} {Ontario} {Series} in {Philosophy} of {Science}},
title = {Counterfactuals and {Two} {Kinds} of {Expected} {Utility}},
isbn = {978-94-009-9117-0},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_8},
abstract = {We begin with a rough theory of rational decision-making. In the first place, rational decision-making involves conditional propositions: when a person weighs a major decision, it is rational for him to ask, for each act he considers, what would happen if he performed that act. It is rational, then, for him to consider propositions of the form ‘If I were to do a, then c would happen’. Such a proposition we shall call a counterfactual, and we shall form counterfactuals with a connective ‘☐→' on this pattern: ‘If I were to do a, then c would happen’ is to be written ‘I do a ‘☐→' c happens’.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2020-06-12},
booktitle = {{IFS}: {Conditionals}, {Belief}, {Decision}, {Chance} and {Time}},
publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
author = {Gibbard, Allan and Harper, William L.},
editor = {Harper, William L. and Stalnaker, Robert and Pearce, Glenn},
year = {1981},
doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_8},
keywords = {Conditional Probability, Conditionalized State, Decision Problem, Expected Utility, Logical Truth},
pages = {153--190},
}
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