Externalism and memory. Gilbertson, E. Southwest Philosophy Review, 16(1):51–58, 2000.
Externalism and memory [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
[first paragraph] Atempts to defend compatibilism, the view that externalism about content is compatible with introspective knowledge of content, have typically involved the view that the contents of second-order thoughts are inherited from the first-order thoughts they are about. Call the view that
@article{Gilbertson2000,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Atempts to defend compatibilism, the view that externalism about content is compatible with introspective knowledge of content, have typically involved the view that the contents of second-order thoughts are inherited from the first-order thoughts they are about. Call the view that},
author = {Gilbertson, Eric},
doi = {10.5840/swphilreview200016130},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Gilbertson - 2000 - Externalism and memory.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0897-2346},
journal = {Southwest Philosophy Review},
number = {1},
pages = {51--58},
title = {{Externalism and memory}},
url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url{\_}ver=Z39.88-2004{\&}rft{\_}val{\_}fmt={\&}rft.imuse{\_}id=swphilreview{\_}2000{\_}0016{\_}0001{\_}0051{\_}0058{\&}svc{\_}id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection},
volume = {16},
year = {2000}
}

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