On grounding in Bolzano. Ginammi, A. & Betti, A. 0.
abstract   bibtex   
Bolzano's writings on grounding raise various interpretative issues which thus far have not been satisfactorily resolved in the literature. Ginammi et al.\textasciitilde(2019) indicates that Bolzano's notion of grounding, i.e.\textasciitildethe hierarchy of truths in proper science, can best be understood as dependent on a hierarchy of concepts. When seen in connection with the hierarchy of concepts, Bolzano's requirement that grounds be simpler and at least as general as their consequences gets a highly natural interpretation. We set forth an alternative account of grounding in which we show in detail the role that the conceptual hierarchy plays in the grounding structure. By so doing, we are able to offer an interpretation of grounding which is more natural than the current leading interpretation (Roski 2017, Roski \textbackslash& Rumberg), and which moreover is more than the leading interpretation in agreement with Bolzano's writings about grounding. Our account of grounding is also new in that it is built up from the bottom: it starts from an analysis of Bolzano's understanding of the relata of grounding, i.e.\textasciitilde(collections of) truths. We will argue that the relative weight that simplicity and generality play for grounding differs when considering grounding across sciences from when considering grounding within a science. This can be explained by the fact that for Bolzano concepts, and not objects, determine the domain of a science.
@unpublished{ginammi_grounding_0-1,
	title = {On grounding in {Bolzano}},
	abstract = {Bolzano's writings on grounding raise various interpretative issues which thus far have not been satisfactorily resolved in the literature. Ginammi et al.{\textasciitilde}(2019) indicates that Bolzano's notion of grounding, i.e.{\textasciitilde}the hierarchy of truths in proper science, can best be understood as dependent on a hierarchy of concepts. When seen in connection with the hierarchy of concepts, Bolzano's requirement that grounds be simpler and at least as general as their consequences gets a highly natural interpretation. We set forth an alternative account of grounding in which we show in detail the role that the conceptual hierarchy plays in the grounding structure. By so doing, we are able to offer an interpretation of grounding which is more natural than the current leading interpretation (Roski 2017, Roski {\textbackslash}\& Rumberg), and which moreover is more than the leading interpretation in agreement with Bolzano's writings about grounding. Our account of grounding is also new in that it is built up from the bottom: it starts from an analysis of Bolzano's understanding of the relata of grounding, i.e.{\textasciitilde}(collections of) truths. 
We will argue that the relative weight that simplicity and generality play for grounding differs when considering grounding across sciences from when considering grounding within a science. This can be explained by the fact that for Bolzano concepts, and not objects, determine the domain of a science.},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {0},
}

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