Bolzano on necessary truths and the division between the conceptual and empirical sciences. Ginammi, A. 0.
abstract   bibtex   
This paper will argue that Bolzano's conception of necessary truth should be understood in the light of the `traditional theory of concepts', that is, the theory of concepts originated form Aristotle's \\textbackslashem Praedicabilia\ and adhered to for example by Kant. It will explain Bolzano's conception of the relationship between conceptual truth and necessary truth in the light of this theory, and it will argue against existing literature that Bolzano accepted also necessary empirical truths. It will argue that Bolzano's distinction between concepts and intuitions should be understood in connection with his distinction between necessary and contingent truth. This all relates to Bolzano's view on the conceptual hierarchy and the relation of subordination between concepts. One issue which arises is whether in Bolzano's view subordination relations between concepts can be \\textbackslashem de facto\ (contingent). Although on the basis of Bolzano's definitions subordination can be \\textbackslashem de facto\, we will argue that because of the role of subordination for necessary truth there should be no room for \\textbackslashem de facto\ subordination.
@unpublished{ginammi_bolzano_0-1,
	title = {Bolzano on necessary truths and the division between the conceptual and empirical sciences},
	abstract = {This paper will argue that Bolzano's conception of necessary truth should be understood in the light of the `traditional theory of concepts', that is, the theory of concepts originated form Aristotle's \{{\textbackslash}em Praedicabilia\} and adhered to for example by Kant. It will explain Bolzano's conception of the relationship between conceptual truth and necessary truth in the light of this theory, and it will argue against existing literature that Bolzano accepted also necessary empirical truths. It will argue that Bolzano's distinction between concepts and intuitions should be understood in connection with his distinction between necessary and contingent truth. This all relates to Bolzano's view on the conceptual hierarchy and the relation of subordination between concepts. One issue which arises is whether in Bolzano's view subordination relations between concepts can be \{{\textbackslash}em de facto\} (contingent). Although on the basis of Bolzano's definitions subordination can be \{{\textbackslash}em de facto\}, we will argue that because of the role of subordination for necessary truth there should be no room for \{{\textbackslash}em de facto\} subordination.},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola},
	year = {0},
}

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