@article{Glick2011,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Since Gilbert Ryle's discussions of knowledge-how and knowledge-that (Ryle 1949; 1946), the alleged distinction has received a significant amount of attention. The attention is well-deserved, since Ryle's topic bears on philosophical issues from physicalism to the semantics of atti- tude attributions, besides having intrinsic interest for contributing to our understanding of the mind. I will argue, however, that to make progress on this topic, we must make some distinctions that have been neglected in the literature.},
author = {Glick, Ephraim},
doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00438.x},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Glick - 2011 - Two methodologies for evaluating intellectualism.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00318205},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
number = {2},
pages = {398--434},
title = {{Two methodologies for evaluating intellectualism}},
url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00438.x},
volume = {83},
year = {2011}
}

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