Interpersonal epistemic entitlements. Goldberg, S. C. Philosophical Issues, 24(1):159–183, 2014. ![Interpersonal epistemic entitlements [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others' processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, and a more “extended” epistemology—one that calls into question the epistemic significance that has traditionally been ascribed to the boundaries separating individual subjects.
@article{Goldberg2014,
abstract = {In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others' processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, and a more “extended” epistemology—one that calls into question the epistemic significance that has traditionally been ascribed to the boundaries separating individual subjects.},
author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.},
doi = {10.1111/phis.12029},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Goldberg - 2014 - Interpersonal epistemic entitlements.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {15336077},
issn = {15336077},
journal = {Philosophical Issues},
number = {1},
pages = {159--183},
pmid = {102349930},
title = {{Interpersonal epistemic entitlements}},
url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phis.12029},
volume = {24},
year = {2014}
}
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