@article{Goldberg2011,
abstract = {In Sven Bernecker' s excellent new book, Memory, he proposes an account of what we might call the "metasemantics" of memory: the conditions that determine the contents of the mental representations employed in memory. Bernecker endorses a "pastist externalist" view, according to which the content of a memory-constituting representation is fixed, in part, by the "external" conditions prevalent at the (past) time of the tokening of the original representation (the one from which the memory-constituting one is causally derived). Bernecker argues that the best version of a pastist externalism about memory contents will have the result that there can be semantically-induced memory losses in cases involving unwitting "world-switching". The burden of this paper is to show that Bernecker' s argument for this conclusion does not succeed. My arguments on this score have implications for our picture of mind-world relations, as these are reflected in a subject's attempts to recall her past thoughts.},
author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-010-9642-9},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Goldberg - 2011 - The metasemantics of memory.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0031-8116},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
number = {1},
pages = {95--107},
title = {{The metasemantics of memory}},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/41487618 http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-010-9642-9},
volume = {153},
year = {2011}
}

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