@TechReport{greene:thesis,
  author = {Emily Greene},
  title = {{ShareABEL: Secure Sharing of mHealth Data through
  Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control}},
  year = {2017},
  month = {July},
  number = {TR2017-827},
  institution = {Dartmouth College, Computer Science},
  address = {Hanover, NH},
  category = {mhealth},
  group = {dfk},
  vitatype = {07},
  URL = {http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2017-827.pdf},
  keywords = {mHealth, security, Amulet},
  abstract = {Owners of mobile-health apps and devices often want to share
  their mHealth data with others, such as physicians, therapists, coaches, and
  caregivers. For privacy reasons, however, they typically want to share a
  limited subset of their information with each recipient according to their
  preferences. In this paper, we introduce ShareABEL, a scalable, usable, and
  practical system that allows mHealth-data owners to specify access-control
  policies and to cryptographically enforce those policies so that only parties
  with the proper corresponding permissions are able to decrypt data. The
  design (and prototype implementation) of this system makes three
  contributions: (1) it applies cryptographically-enforced access-control
  measures to wearable healthcare data, which pose different challenges than
  Electronic Medical Records (EMRs), (2) it recognizes the temporal nature of
  mHealth data streams and supports revocation of access to part or all of a
  data stream, and (3) it departs from the vendor- and device-specific silos of
  mHealth data by implementing a secure end-to-end system that can be applied
  to data collected from a variety of mHealth apps and devices.},
  comment = {Completed July 2017, released May 2018. This TR represents a
  Senior Honors Thesis, which was later revised and published as follows: Emily
  Greene, Patrick Proctor, and David Kotz. Secure Sharing of mHealth Data
  Streams through Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control. Journal of Smart
  Health, April 2018. DOI 10.1016/j.smhl.2018.01.003.}
}

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For privacy reasons, however, they typically want to share a limited subset of their information with each recipient according to their preferences. In this paper, we introduce ShareABEL, a scalable, usable, and practical system that allows mHealth-data owners to specify access-control policies and to cryptographically enforce those policies so that only parties with the proper corresponding permissions are able to decrypt data. The design (and prototype implementation) of this system makes three contributions: (1) it applies cryptographically-enforced access-control measures to wearable healthcare data, which pose different challenges than Electronic Medical Records (EMRs), (2) it recognizes the temporal nature of mHealth data streams and supports revocation of access to part or all of a data stream, and (3) it departs from the vendor- and device-specific silos of mHealth data by implementing a secure end-to-end system that can be applied to data collected from a variety of mHealth apps and devices.","comment":"Completed July 2017, released May 2018. This TR represents a Senior Honors Thesis, which was later revised and published as follows: Emily Greene, Patrick Proctor, and David Kotz. Secure Sharing of mHealth Data Streams through Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control. Journal of Smart Health, April 2018. DOI 10.1016/j.smhl.2018.01.003.","bibtex":"@TechReport{greene:thesis,\n author = {Emily Greene},\n title = {{ShareABEL: Secure Sharing of mHealth Data through\n Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control}},\n year = {2017},\n month = {July},\n number = {TR2017-827},\n institution = {Dartmouth College, Computer Science},\n address = {Hanover, NH},\n category = {mhealth},\n group = {dfk},\n vitatype = {07},\n URL = {http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2017-827.pdf},\n keywords = {mHealth, security, Amulet},\n abstract = {Owners of mobile-health apps and devices often want to share\n their mHealth data with others, such as physicians, therapists, coaches, and\n caregivers. For privacy reasons, however, they typically want to share a\n limited subset of their information with each recipient according to their\n preferences. In this paper, we introduce ShareABEL, a scalable, usable, and\n practical system that allows mHealth-data owners to specify access-control\n policies and to cryptographically enforce those policies so that only parties\n with the proper corresponding permissions are able to decrypt data. The\n design (and prototype implementation) of this system makes three\n contributions: (1) it applies cryptographically-enforced access-control\n measures to wearable healthcare data, which pose different challenges than\n Electronic Medical Records (EMRs), (2) it recognizes the temporal nature of\n mHealth data streams and supports revocation of access to part or all of a\n data stream, and (3) it departs from the vendor- and device-specific silos of\n mHealth data by implementing a secure end-to-end system that can be applied\n to data collected from a variety of mHealth apps and devices.},\n comment = {Completed July 2017, released May 2018. This TR represents a\n Senior Honors Thesis, which was later revised and published as follows: Emily\n Greene, Patrick Proctor, and David Kotz. Secure Sharing of mHealth Data\n Streams through Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control. Journal of Smart\n Health, April 2018. DOI 10.1016/j.smhl.2018.01.003.}\n}\n\n","author_short":["Greene, E."],"key":"greene:thesis","id":"greene:thesis","bibbaseid":"greene-shareabelsecuresharingofmhealthdatathroughcryptographicallyenforcedaccesscontrol-2017","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2017-827.pdf"},"keyword":["mHealth","security","Amulet"],"downloads":0,"html":""},"search_terms":["shareabel","secure","sharing","mhealth","data","through","cryptographically","enforced","access","control","greene"],"keywords":["mhealth","security","amulet"],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["maBj9Kn3cKbuX2kkK"]}