Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critical Thinking Mislead Cognition. Grundmann, T. In The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021.
Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critical Thinking Mislead Cognition [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. This chapter argues that these two Enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also further the spread of conspiracy theories and undermine trust in experts. As a result, we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter
@incollection{grundmann_facing_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Facing {Epistemic} {Authorities}: {Where} {Democratic} {Ideals} and {Critical} {Thinking} {Mislead} {Cognition}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	shorttitle = {Facing {Epistemic} {Authorities}},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-7},
	abstract = {Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. This chapter argues that these two Enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also further the spread of conspiracy theories and undermine trust in experts. As a result, we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Grundmann, Thomas},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0007},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), deliberative democracy, democratic ideals, epistemic deference, experts, pre-emption view},
}

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