HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY. Hazlett, A. Episteme, 9(3):205–223, September, 2012. ZSCC: 0000100 Publisher: Cambridge University Press![HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.
@article{hazlett_higher-order_2012,
title = {{HIGHER}-{ORDER} {EPISTEMIC} {ATTITUDES} {AND} {INTELLECTUAL} {HUMILITY}},
volume = {9},
issn = {1742-3600, 1750-0117},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/higherorder-epistemic-attitudes-and-intellectual-humility/02D68F90E182427F06E86190B365F9DA},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2012.11},
abstract = {This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.},
language = {en},
number = {3},
urldate = {2020-08-08},
journal = {Episteme},
author = {Hazlett, Allan},
month = sep,
year = {2012},
note = {ZSCC: 0000100
Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
pages = {205--223},
}
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