@article{Hirstein2000,
abstract = {Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hold two con- tradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or implausible. A phe- nomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confabulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without intent to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflict is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a 'conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valuable clues about the structure of normal human knowledge- gathering processes.},
author = {Hirstein, William},
doi = {10.1086/392835},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Hirstein - 2000 - Self-deception and confabulation.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0031-8248},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
number = {Proceedings},
pages = {S418--S429},
title = {{Self-deception and confabulation}},
url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/392835},
volume = {67},
year = {2000}
}

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